The new guidelines on the abortion pill have brought a long-standing and unrelenting debate on abortion back to the forefront. While the minister and some newspapers enthusiastically welcomed the development: "It's an important step forward in full compliance with Law 194, which is and remains a civilized law in our country" (Minister Speranza's comment in a Facebook post), " Abortion , the last no falls. Minister Speranza changes the directive: the RU486 pill can be used without hospitalization" ( La Repubblica headline ), Catholic newspapers described the development less enthusiastically: " RU486. Medical abortion becomes do-it-yourself, the minister's announcement (via tweet)" (Avvenire).
But is it possible to get to the ideological root of the problem? And perhaps even overcome the bitter conflict between the two positions? According to Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, this isn't possible. Let's see why.
Abortion Debate: The Italian Situation

Let's begin by recalling the legal framework regarding abortion in our country. Since May 22, 1978, voluntary termination of pregnancy has been permitted in Italy, not only for serious health reasons, but also for unwanted pregnancy. Law 194, in fact, allows women the option of having an abortion in a public facility during the first 90 days of pregnancy. Article 9 of Law 194, however, allows for conscientious objection by healthcare professionals, slowing down procedures and complicating the exercise of this right. And here we are in the midst of the abortion debate , who has never heard the cry:
- "L'abortion It is murder and it is an aberrant practice!”
- “No, life does not begin at conception, and terminating a pregnancy is every woman's inviolable right to choose for her own body!”
How do we navigate this? And why is it so difficult to reach a stable position on this issue? MacIntyre has attempted to get to the heart of the matter, making it abundantly clear why the abortion debate seems destined for an eternal clash of opposing positions.
Two incommensurable positions?
According to the philosopher, it would be impossible to establish a consensus on certain ethical issues given the incommensurability of moral judgments. This means that there are various reasons for or against the right to abortion, and all of these reasons are equally acceptable and must be tolerated. The abortion debate is a prime example of how one can fall into this impasse. MacIntyre identifies three different positions structured in terms of competing moral arguments:

- According to the first position, appealing to each person's right to own and decide on their own body, it will be argued that a woman, at the stage where the embryo is essentially part of her body, has the right to decide in complete freedom whether or not to abort. It follows that abortion is morally permissible and must be guaranteed by law.
- The second position is based on the belief that an embryo is a well-defined individual and, as such, holds the right to life.abortion It would therefore be murder in all respects, it would be morally wrong to commit it and, therefore, it should be prohibited by law.
- The third position is that of the moderates, according to whom, since it is not possible to establish whether the fetus, or even before that the embryo, is conscious life or not, they find themselves in balance between the two positions. The moderates, not being able to exclude with certainty that theabortion is a real murder, they should deny the right to abortion, if only out of respect for their fellow citizens pro life.
Pro life VS Pro choice
Leaving aside the doubters who swell the ranks of anti-abortionists, it's clear that these opposing arguments have a certain logical validity and are both respectable. Yet, mediation between them is impossible. Those who consider abortion to be murder cannot admit exceptions and cannot be tolerant of pro-choice advocates . Conversely, pro-choice advocates don't want to be denied a right and feel the obligation to continue an unwanted pregnancy as a true violation of their freedom.

Conceptual incommensurability
The crux of the matter lies precisely in the conceptual incommensurability of these arguments, a term MacIntyre borrows directly from epistemology. This means that the different positions are perfectly coherent and reasonable, but mutually incompatible. They are reasonable and coherent because the conclusions follow precisely from the premises: for example, if we assume as a premise that murder is an evil and the embryo is a fully developed individual , it rationally follows that abortion is murder and should therefore be prohibited by law. However, from the premises, everyone has rights over their own person, including their own body, and the embryo , at an early stage of its development, is an effective part of the mother's body. It rationally follows that the right to abort is part of the rights of possession and choice regarding one's own body.
Each premise employs axiological or normative concepts that are very different from those of the others. As a result, public discussion of certain moral issues is interminable unless an external authority is appealed to, acting as a judge, to resolve the conflict by asserting one side's position over the other. From the different conclusions, the premises can be rationally deduced, but once these premises are reached, the discussion settles into their simple affirmation or denial. And this is why we have been stuck for years in the simple repetition of conflicting assertions: abortion is a right ! Abortion is murder!
The abortion debate: what's the solution?
To overcome the problems MacIntyre revealed, we need to find common ground on which to re-establish the debate . We need to break out of this impasse by proposing a new strategy that doesn't involve reiterating one's position or speaking out loudly. One can, for example, defend one's opinion by starting from the premises of others. So, let's now try to support the right to abortion by accepting the affirmation that life begins at conception. In this way, by both sides starting from the same premise, we can also lead the other to understand our own conclusions. The positions of both will not be incommensurable , but will have a basis for comparison.
How to proceed? New arguments must be introduced. American philosopher Judith Thomson , for example, shifts the issue from the realm of bioethics to that of law, providing the debate with a new terrain. Therefore, once the premise that the fetus is life is accepted, we proceed to analyze the two different rights at stake (of the woman and of the fetus or embryo), asking: if it is true that the fetus is a person, does it necessarily follow that it already possesses all rights, including the right to life?

Thomson: having rights = having interests to protect
Thomson states that possessing rights presupposes also having interests to protect: an individual acquires rights when he or she has hopes and plans for life. Only if given the opportunity to develop spontaneously will the embryo also acquire interests and with them certain rights: consider the right to vote, which will be granted once the child reaches eighteen. But there is a further limitation. To possess true rights, an individual must desire something about its present, not its future . This does not mean that the fetus, one day, will have the interest and will to defend its own life.
Thomson's painting metaphor might help clarify this point. Think of a painting: it has no interests. Naturally, we can damage it, for example by spilling ink on it or exposing it to sunlight for several days. This damage, however, wouldn't impede the painting's desire to pursue its own ends, since it has none.
Abortion Debate: Toward a More Equal Society
This comparison, evidently, doesn't solve the problem. An embryo isn't exactly a painting, and we can't be certain it doesn't have an interest in evolving and living. Any biological material that tends to develop and multiply on our planet has this interest. But even granting the embryo life and an interest in living, can we say it has a greater right to develop at the expense of the freedom to manage and decide about its own body than an adult, fully conscious woman?

Perhaps a true conclusion to the long and heated debate on abortion will only come when we are able to answer philosophical questions as old as humankind itself: What is life ? What is conscience ? What is will ? For now, we could try to orient ourselves by exploring the legal field and decide together, democratically, what is most important to us.
The right to life of a fertilized cell or the autonomy of women?
In order to build a freer and more just society, we must ask ourselves: the right to life of a fertilized cell or the autonomy of women? We must ask ourselves what kind of world we want to build for future generations, and address important ethical questions from a new perspective of equity and emancipation. Considering that the protection of the right to life, broadly understood, should encompass every existing elemental form—a highly ambitious and unlikely project—perhaps the time has come to take a step forward for our democratic society and restore women's freedom to choose and decide about their own bodies.
John Massaro


































