We begin the first part of this column, entitled " Epistemology of the Social Sciences ." We will address, from different angles and albeit rather briefly, the paradigmatic perspectives or approaches of the social sciences in general. This means that the plurality of aspects we will encounter will concern the "human sciences"—as Dilthey liked to call them—considered in their fundamental multiparadigmatic nature. For example, just as in political science the elements that characterize structuralist analysis are distinguished from pluralist analysis, in sociology the discussion focuses on the relationship and, at the same time, the distance between Durkheim's or Pareto's positivism and the constructivist school inaugurated by Weber and taken to its extreme by the work of Berger and Luckmann.
In general, we can separate the multiplicity of aspects found in the various paradigms into the notions of " erklären " and " verstehen ." Let's see in detail what these two expressions mean and how they can be applied to the systematization of epistemology within the broader framework of the social sciences.
To explain
Any paradigm that seeks to harklären— " to explain," from the German—in turn draws on the legacy of nineteenth-century positivism, with the inherent power of hard data , that is, quantitative data, which are processed to "discover" the laws underlying social, political, and economic dynamics . The great strength of this "self-confident" approach lies in its connection to monocausalism. This aspires to define a single cause as the trigger for a given effect.
Therefore, in its apparent safety, the erklären approach forgets and neglects the complex social dynamics as it unfolds as a multi-caused and co-caused process from different sources. Just as—and here the major limitations of nineteenth-century "naive" positivism emerge—it is difficult to isolate and circumscribe causes from effects. Avoid confusing them, keep them separate and analyze them, since, as is well established, society, like politics or economics, are objects of investigation that are highly elusive to anachronistic analysis. Therefore, in this sense, from this type of approach one can extrapolate (at least to a certain degree of reliability) laws. This is why we speak of "nomothetic" disciplines.
Understand
Unlike paradigms inspired by erklären , which invoke the dimension of causation, the notion of verstehen— "to understand," from the German—has assumed, from the height of its tradition, the centrality of the human spirit as a center irreducible to the deterministic dimension of causation. Conversely, it involves reconsidering the Kantian subject as a relatively autonomous center of decisions and choices, which cannot be treated like a "puppet" (as Durkheim put it regarding individuals). Therefore, in any case of humanistic inquiry that claims to be such, the scholar must consider understanding the subjects of primary importance to the investigation.
For example, to adequately explain the behavior of a group of revolutionaries, one must understand the particular point of view adopted by its participants. Then, based on the empirical findings, one must understand the values, norms, ambitions, emotions, goals, and traditions of at least most of the participating actors. Clearly, the limitation of this approach lies in the fact that it is not possible to infer "laws" as the positivists of the early nineteenth century desired. Instead, one can speak of "idiographic" disciplines, that is, those disciplines that seek to describe a particular point of view in the most minute detail.
A possible conciliation
From this brief presentation, the reader may find it difficult to summarize the two approaches : one is oriented toward the search for nomoi in social life, that is, for immutable laws in the social terrain. The other is inspired more by the search for idios , that is, the specificities of a phenomenon, a group, an individual, etc. At this point, it is essential to clarify how, faced with different research questions, the two approaches —erklären and verstehen— can be intertwined in the same research, with contributions from both sides.
After all, searching for social patterns by isolating the variables relevant to the researcher can lead to discovering "what encourages what" in terms of causes and effects that can explain a phenomenon. Meanwhile, delving deeper into the perspective adopted by one or more actors leads the researcher to develop an empathetic bond with the subject studied and, in terms of depth and completeness of analysis, can lead to an understanding of the phenomenon studied.
Despite the brevity of this article, a fundamental point still needs to be clarified. In actual practice, social researchers rarely agree on the specific methodology and techniques to employ, especially when collaborating with followers of one paradigm or another. The notions of erklären and verstehen we have referred to are rather ideal types, in the most Weberian sense of the term. That is, they are ideal abstractions, or precepts, pertaining to the ethical sphere of oughtness, to which scientists should generally refer.
Ethics of the social scientist
The ethics of the social scientist —however much we may delude ourselves into thinking that it represents a sort of "sanctity" untouched by any passion, alternative ideal, interest, etc.—is not always a duty that coincides with being. In other words, the social scientist is not always willing to compromise with the facts; often, in fact, the underlying theory prevails. He will therefore cling to his own hypotheses just as he will seek their confirmation in reality.
In conclusion, where is the reconciliation ? It exists to the extent that we believe that, in principle, these paradigmatic orientations can be integrated into the same theoretical framework, and therefore be applied appropriately in the context of research aimed at confirming or disproving the theory. If, as things stand, it is not possible to integrate different approaches and share a common language within the same discipline, we must remember that only the effort to overcome these barriers allows science to progress.
Bibliography:
- By Uncle S., Agustoni A., Maretti M., Research methodology, Milan, Einaudi, 2012.
- Corbetta P., Social research: methodology and techniques. See The reference paradigms, Bologna, il Mulino, 2003.
